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AIM GLOBALLY
Martin S. Flaherty*

INTRODUCTION

Recently, the Hong Kong judiciary dealt with a case that
could not be more foreign nor more familiar. In HKSAR v. Ng
Kung Siu, two dissidents were convicted of, among other things,
desecrating the national flag in violation of local and Chinese
law. 1 The two challenged their convictions, arguing that the ban
violated the Hong Kong Basic Law, which effectively serves as
the city's constitution within the People's Republic of China.
The intermediate Court of Appeal invalidated the flag desecration ban on two grounds. It held first that the Basic Law incorporated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
including "the right to freedom of expression."2 It then concluded that this general concept protected even the defacing of
sacred national symbols. For this proposition the court cited no
English precedents from Hong Kong's colonial past and still less
any Chinese principles from its uncertain present. Instead it
staked its claim squarely and almost exclusively on Texas v.
Iohnson 3 and United States v. Eichman. 4 Hong Kong's highest
tribunal, the Court of Final Appeal, reversed. 5 Yet here too, the
* Professor, Fordham Law School; Co-Director, Joseph R. Crowley Program in
International Human Rights; Visiting Professor, China University of Political Science
and Law, Beijing, Spring 1999. My thanks to my fellow members of the Georgetown Biennial Discussion Group on Constitutional Law for useful comments. Special thanks to
Mark Tushnet for his efforts organizing the discussion group over the years, for arranging
publication of this year's session and for his patience and understanding with regard to
this piece. My thanks as well to Curtis Bradley for reviewing an earlier draft with a critical eye.
1. See HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu, (1999] 2 HKC 10, 18-20 (opinion of the Court of
Appeal of Hong Kong), available at LEXIS-NEXIS, Hong Kong Cases Database, 1999-2
HKClO.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General
Assembly on Dec. 19,1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 19(2) ("ICCPR").
3. 491 u.s. 397 (1989).
4. 496 u.s. 310 (1990).
5. See HKSAR v. Ng Kung Sui, (2000]1 HKC 117 (Opinion of the Court of Final
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American cases made an appearance. In a careful concurrence,
Justice Bokhary noted how both Supreme Court decisions had
been decided by a single vote, in part to justify the Court of Final
Appeal coming out the other way, but also to declare that the local flag desecration laws "lie just within the outer limits of constitutionality. "6
Ng Kung Siu demonstrates the ongoing power of the U.S.
legal canon abroad. This may not be a new story, but the narrative is picking up speed. National and transnational courts-especially constitutional tribunals-have long invoked U.S. decisions even as our judiciary seems bent on repudiating them. Just
months before deciding the flag case, Hong Kong's first venture
into judicial review self-consciously tracked Marbury. 7 Outside
courtrooms popular movements, too, have drawn upon U.S. staples, as witness South Africa and Eastern Europe. One need not
be a crit to figure out that this sort of thing will only increase as
law follows power in a world facing globalization under the aegis
of a lone superpower. Not for nothing does China's new national contract law discard much of the German civil law tradition to borrow instead upon the Uniform Commercial Code.
Yet Ng Kung Siu by comparison also shows the U.S. legal
culture at its worst, and not just because Johnson and Eichman
might well not come out the same way today. It has long been
an international truism that the United States is exceptionally
parochial, especially for a great power. This too is an old story,
one with unfortunately little narrative development. In failing
his (admittedly unfair) pop quiz on world leaders, George W.
Bush may at the time have gained more votes than he lost. Next
to American jurists, however, "W." seemed a cosmopolite worthy of the Hong Kong bench. Those rare counsel who do cite
non-U.S.law typically do not get very far. Here think of the Su-

Appeal of Hong Kong), available at LEXIS-NEXIS, Hong Kong Cases Database, 2000-1
HKC117.
6. Id. at 70 (Bokhary, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Bokhary also noted Justice Kennedy's discomfort with voting to invalidate the Texas statute. See id. at 63-64
(Bokhary, J., concurring). He also reviewed the judicial response to flag desecration
bans in Italy, Germany, Norway, Japan, and Portugal. See id. at 64-67.
7. See Ng Ka Ling (an infant) v. Director of Immigration, [1999]1 HKC 291, available at LEXIS-NEXIS, Hong Kong Cases Database, 1999-2 HKC 291; Chan Kam Nga
(an infant) v. Director of Immigration, [1999]1 HKC 347, available at LEXIS-NEXIS,
Hong Kong Cases Database, 1999-1 HKC 347. For an account of the controversy surrounding these decisions, see generally Report of the Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights, One Country, Two Legal Systems?, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1
(1999).
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preme Court's almost sneering dismissal of Justice Breyer's suggestion that the European Union's actual practice belied what
the majority had said was all but a logical impossibility in a
multi-sovereign federal system. 8 With incentives like this, it is
small wonder that the vast majority of U.S. law students graduate without having the least idea about the status of U.S. treaties
in domestic law, the basics of a civil law system, or the applicability of international custom.
Nowhere is this problem worse than the canon, especially its
constitutional division. U.S. casebooks and law reviews grace
the shelves of underfunded law schools in Beijing and are requested from less fortunate institutions in Bosnia, Haiti, and (in
exile) Burma. More and more these materials cover not just
case law, but history, economics, philosophy and the contributions of the previously voiceless. But, to a one, they have next to
nothing to say about how the world's last superpower engages
with the law beyond its borders. The balance of this Essay will
first consider the scope of the problem in two essential areas: the
constitutional law of foreign affairs and international law applicable to the United States. 9 It will then suggest at least certain
essentials without which no casebook, course, or hornbook in
U.S. constitutional law can be considered complete. On the theory that we must crawl before we can run, these basics will be
mainly but not entirely confined to old time case law. For foreign affairs law, the short list includes Foster v. Neilson, 10 Reid v.
1
Covert/ The Paquete Habana/ 2 and Missouri v. Holland. 13 For
applicable international law the candidates include UN Charter,
the ICCPR, Soering v. United Kingdom, 14 and Filartiga v. PenaIrala.15

8. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997); Martin S. Flaherty,
Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 Colo. L.
Rev. 1277, 1288 (1999).
9. A third vital area that should be integrated into the constitutional law canon is
comparative approaches from other jurisdictions. See Vicki C. Jackson and Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 1999).
10. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
11. 354 u.s. 1 (1957).
12. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
13. 252 u.s. 416 (1920).
14. 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 439 (1989).
15. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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I. TERRAINCOGNITA
Wherever else they get it, law students do not encounter the
world outside our borders through American constitutional law
casebooks. This at any rate is how things look from a quick, unscientific, yet almost certainly representative survey of the free
volumes that publishers annually add to a typical professor's
shelf. As Louis Henkin points out, "This was not always so. In
earlier days, the constitutional law of foreign affairs was one,
important, integral part of constitutional debate and study." 16 It
is not so now. Specialization, national hubris, and fixation with
the Supreme Court all have something to do with this. Regardless of the cause, casebooks indicate that international concerns
are almost entirely outside the canon. With regard to constitutional foreign affairs law, the coverage ranges from the pretextual to the non-existent. With regard to international standards
that bind the United States, the coverage is less than that.
Tum first to foreign affairs law. As noted, the term as used
here simply refers to the often complex ways in which the Constitution mediates between international law and the domestic
legal order. How are treaties made? More importantly, what is
a self-executing vs. a non-self-executing treaty? What are reservations, understandings, and declarations? Can a treaty extend
federal power not otherwise delegated in the Constitution? Can
a treaty abridge individual rights? "States'" rights? Not long
ago, assembling material on these matters would have been no
easy task. Yet readily available scholarship has filled this gap for
at least a generation. Henkin's Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, first published in 1972, recently went into its second edition.
Likewise, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States appeared in 1987. At nearly the same time
any number of casebooks in public international law, international human rights, even international business transactions also
came out addressing some or all of these matters. Debate on
almost all these questions, moreover, has freshly arisen as a
"new foreign affairs law" school seeks to challenge the "ortho17
doxy" on these matters that has stood for most of the century.

16. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution vii (2d ed. 1996).
17. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1089 (1999) (introductory essay on American foreign affairs law at the end
of the twentieth century, describing law as "more tolerant of state involvement in foreign
affairs, more willing to impose limits on the national government's extension of power,
and less reliant on the judiciary to maintain foreign affairs uniformity"). For efforts at
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That said, it would be difficult to discover any of this in an
introductory constitutional law course. Many casebooks begin
promisingly enough, offering sections or subsections devoted in
some way to "foreign affairs." Yet nearly all of these turn out to
serve mainly as adjuncts to domestic concerns, typically separation of powers or federalism. Many "foreign affairs" sections accordingly spotlight material such as the United States v. CurtissWright, the War Powers Resolution, or even Youngstown Sheet
and Tube v. Sawyer. 18 While these materials deal with the domestic allocation of authority to affect foreign affairs, none of
them primarily go to the question of how foreign affairs may affect domestic authority. The main exception here is the frequent
inclusion of Missouri v. Holland, which deals with the newly
relevant question of whether treaties can augment Congressional
authority otherwise unavailable under domestic grants of power
such as the Commerce Clause. As such, the case is an essential
chesnut in any foreign affairs course. 19 But even here, Missouri
does not primarily appear to illustrate the potentially vast source
of power that the current treaty obligations may afford the federal government. Rather, it mainly comes in either to illustrate
the doctrines of limited or separated powers20 or, more creatively, to generate questions about changing interpretive con-

both describing and forging the "new foreign affairs law," see generally Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev.
1396 (1999); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, g"J Mich. L.
Rev. 390 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815
(1997). For responses, see generally David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation:
The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L.
Rev. 1075 (2000); Harold Hongju Koh,/s International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 1824 (1998); Beth Stephens, The Law of our Land: Customary International Law
as Federal Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 393 (lm); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 371 (1997).
18. The casebook I have often used is one example: Geoffrey R. Stone, eta!., Constitutional Law 473-93 (Aspen, 3d ed. 1996). See also Ronald D. Rotunda, Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes 223-36 (West, 5th ed. 1997).
19. It can also be the basis of applying foreign affairs law to domestic controversies.
See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 Const. Comm. 33
(1997) (arguing that human rights treaties to which the United States is a member provide an independent justification for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
20. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec and Stephen B. Presser, The American Constitutional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy 497 (Anderson, 1998 ed.); Willam B. Lockhart, eta!., The American Constitution: Cases-Comments-Questions 113-14 (West, 8th ed.
1996).
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21

texts. For these reasons, it often does not appear in a separate
"foreign affairs" section at all.
So much for the foreign affairs matters that do filter in.
More generally, many, if not most, casebooks effectively offer
nothing on many, if not most, foreign affairs issues under any
rubric. To take one example, neither current doctrine nor related scholarly discussion on whether, for example, treaties can
trump rights shows up-or at most receives a terse note-in: The
American Constitution, by Lockhart, et al.; American Constitutional Interpretation by Murphy, Fleming and Barber, Constitutional Law, by Cohen and Varat; Constitutional Law by Lively,
Haddon, Roberts, and Weaver; Constitutional Law by Stone,
Seidman, Sunstein and Tushnet; Constitutional Law: Themes for
the Constitution's Third Century, by Farber, Eskridge and
Frickey; Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking, by Brest
and Levinson; or the American Constitutional Order by Kmiec
and Presser. As several familiar titles may indicate, this and related omissions hardly occur because the editors have narrow or
parochial interests.
As for international standards themselves, the story is even
more stark. However much they apply as the "supreme Law of
the Land," they simply have no place in the canon. The absence
is especially striking with regard to treaties that are broadly
similar to the Constitution itself. Just a partial list along these
lines includes the U.N. Charter, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),22 and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 23 to name a very few.
A similar pattern is if anything more true of customary international law. This law, too, "is part of our law," 24 though exactly this proposition has come under attack by the "new foreign
affairs" school. International custom also has strong parallels
with domestic constitutional doctrines, most notably Justice
Harlan's approach to substantive Due Process. Customary international law, moreover, has furnished the rule of decision in a
21. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, et al., American Constitutional Interpretation 206-08
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1995); Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 500 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1992). An exception is Rotunda's Modern Constitutional Law, which deals with Missouri as a treaty case at 236-38
(cited in note 18).
22. 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976), ratified by the U.S. June 8,1992.
23. O.A.S. Res. XXX, International Conference of American States, 9th Conf.,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OENSer. UV/1.4 Rev. (1965).
24. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
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number of significant Federal decisions either directly25 or indirectly thanks to Congressional inco~oration of the "law of nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act. Perhaps even more important is the principle famously articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall that just "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of notions if any other possible construction remains." 27 Not only does none of this appear, but here
the omission counts double since it goes to method as well as
substance. Casebooks give students no inkling of how to identify
international custom. Not surprisingly, they also fail to identify
those customary obligations that would make almost any short
list,28 not to mention promising candidates-such as prohibition
against the execution of minors- that would have major conse. us. . practice.
. 29
quences gtven
II. FOREIGN FUNDAMENTALS AND
INTERNATIONAL ESSENTIALS
Small wonder, then, that most American law students, lawyers, and judges have little idea of how international law operates domestically or how the Constitution mediates the two. Just
this term, I told my class on international human rights that, as a
study for a conference at Georgetown, I would ask them at the
outset a number of questions, including whether a treaty could
trump statutes or curtail rights. When almost no one could answer, I thanked them for making just the point I sought. Unfortunately, this typical response also meant that the course would
have to take a detour to cover fundamentals in foreign affairs
law and the essentials in international standards. But it is exactly
these materials that suggest what all American law students
should encounter in the first place. The upper-level detour, in

25. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
26. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadic v.
Karadiii:, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
27. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). For a
reconstruction of this principle, see Curtis A Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Georgetown L.J. 479 (1997). Exactly this rule of interpretation is likely to play a significant part
this term, when the Supreme Court considers the prolonged detention of aliens in Zadvydas v. Underdown, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (Oct 10, 2000) (granting petition of certiorari and
consolidating with Reno v. Ma, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000)).
28. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702
and§ 702 cmt. (1987).
29. See id.
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other words, should furnish the basis for augmenting the firstyear canon.
This canon-within-the-canon logically begins with treaties,
the primary source of international rules. 30 Some nations, such
as Turkey, place treaties above their own constitutions while
others, such as the U.K., require legislative incorporation before
they can operate domestically. The United States, of course,
falls somewhere in between, as was first made clear in Foster v.
Neilson, which held that U.S. treaties are ordinarily selfexecuting, but may be non-self-executing depending upon the
intent of the treatymakers. Aside from its historical importance,
Foster meets all the classic requirements of a canonical case: it
remains the leading precedent in the area; it generates (or is
about to generate) controversy;31 and last but not least, it was
written by John Marshall. As a bonus, Foster all but compels
some consideration of the treatymaking process, including the
Senate's current practice of limiting our treaty obligations
through reservations, understandings, and declarations ~RUDs)
as well as the recently hot topic of executive agreements. 3
Other treaty basics remain, together with cases that go
along with them. The question whether treaties provide Congress with an independent source of power may have seemed
moot after the New Deal, but is newly relevant in light of United
States v. Lopez 33 and City of Boerne v. Flores. 34 For this reason,
Missouri v. Holland merits its unusual popularity. But for this
reason, casebooks should treat the decision for the foreign affairs case that it is, which means highlighting the world of multilateral treaty commitments that could give Congress potentially
30. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(a).
31. See generally John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 Colurn. L. Rev. 1955 (1999); Martin S.
Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as
"Supreme Law of the Land," 99 Colurn. L. Rev. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colurn. L. Rev. 2154 (1999).
32. See generally Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995) (challenging customary interpretation of the Treaty
Clause); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1995) (Treaty
Clause exclusivity as a case study for text and structural constitution/interpretation). For
opposite takes on the use of RUDs, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2000) and
Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 Am. J. lnt'l L. 341 (1995).
33. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
34. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For the relevance of international obligations to the case,
see Neuman, Global Dimension of RFRA at 41-54 (cited in note 19).
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vast new sources of power, rather than as a quirky angle on domestic doctrine. Enhanced treatment of Missouri necessarily
leads to enhanced treatment of Reid v. Covert. As any capable
student would discern, Missouri not only left open whether treaties could trump the Constitution, its expansive view of treaty
power appeared to point in that direction. Reid settled the matter in just the opposite way, holding that a treaty could not diminish individual rights however much it could effectively reduce the power of the states.
Despite recent challenges, international custom also still
counts as "supreme Law." In terms of human rights, this doctrine may well prove more important that the status of treaties.
Even though the the U.S. has finally gotten around to ratifying
most of the major human rights instruments, the Senate has almost always tacked on RUDs that downgrade the nation's obligations to the level of the Constitution. Yet the sheer number of
human rights treaties can also serve as evidence of customary international standards that would bind the U.S. anyway, most
provocatively, in areas such as the death penalty and affirmative
action. For all these reasons, American lawyers in an age of
globalization will be ill-served without at some point coming
across The Paquete Habana, the case that most famously sets out
the principle or Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 35 the
modem case generally read to confirm it. The American legal
community should also have some passing knowledge of why
federal courts have increasingly become a preferred global forum for suits against human rights abusers from around the
world. Here Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and Kadic v. Karadiii: are the
best illustrations of how the Alien Tort Claims Act, first enacted
in 1789, is now read to permit aliens to bring suit against their
former oppressors for violations of modem international custom.
Once these foreign affairs basics gain admittance, the relevant international standards themselves must follow. Double
back, therefore, to the subject of treaties that the Supremacy
Clause makes federal law, that Foster does or does not make
self-executing, and that Senate RUDs usually water down. Time
was when, at least in a rights context, the U.S. had signed so few
instruments that there would have been little to add. This has
changed dramatically in just the last five years. Currently, the

35.

376 u.s. 398 (1964).
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U.S. has ratified no less than ten major multilateral human rights
treaties, and has signed several more.36
Load a canon with too much and it may explode, but at least
a few of these instruments should be part of the inheritance of
any world, and therefore any American, citizen. The short list
begins with the U.N. Charter, or at least the provisions most directly related to U.S. constitutional practice. To depart from
human rights, this would mean Chapter VII, which grants the
Security Council the authority to order coercive measures
against nations that threaten world peace. 37 These provisions
enhanced Presidential assertions during the Gulf War and undermined them at the time of Kosovo. To return to human
rights, likewise essential are Articles 55 38 and 56,39 which obligate
the U.S. to observe fundamental international freedoms and may
yet mandate the enforcement of those standards in federal and
state courts.
These obligations, in turn, suggest at least the mention of
subsequent treaties that define the human rights to which the
Charter refers. Now that we have ratified it, the ICCPR should
head the list. Other candidates include: Convention on the Pre-

36. Ratifications include: the ICCPR (cited in note 2); the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Signed but yet to be ratified instruments include: the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted by
the General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of
All forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 18,
1979; 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; and the American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. See Louis Henkin and John Lawrence Hargrove, eds., Human
Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century 334 (Amer. Society of lnt'l Law,1999).
37. In particular, see U.N. Charter, arts. 39-41.
38. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter states:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being what are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fund~en
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religiOn.
39. Article 56 of the U.N. Charter states: "All Members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55."
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vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,40 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,41 and Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 42 One personal favorite, however, is the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Unlike the Inter-American Convention or other instruments we have yet to ratify, the U.S. is now legally bound to
various provisions of this originally aspirational document. In
consequence applicants can and have brought complaints against
the U.S. before the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights for violations of the Declaration, though the U.S. has
never agreed to take part in the Inter-American process.43
That leaves custom. As noted, customary international law
will probably play at least as great a domestic role as treaties
since Senate RUDs have gutted human rights while international
custom continues to develop. Not unlike substantive Due Process, figuring out acceptable ways of identifying customary international law rules is almost as important as getting to the rules
themselves. But while an array of permissible methods mark the
domestic process, its international counterpart has long had but
a single, fixed, formula. As any international law primer teaches,
a principle becomes customary only if: a) it reflects a general
practice or commitment among the world's nations and b) has
been undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris
sive necessitatis). 44 Single and fixed, however, does not mean
simple. A nation that engages in torture but is publically committed to opposing the practice, for example, more likely than
not counts toward the general international practice against torture. The basic test is still sufficiently simple that no law student
heading off into the next century should escape some encounter
with it, however thorny its actual application can be.
This point goes double given conflicts that appear on the
horizon. Even a more or less fixed formula for unenumerated
norms will generate great debate about specific content. Still,
anyone entering an increasingly globalized legal world should at
least be aware of the debate's terms. At one end, the Restatement (Third) erred on the side of a short, readily defensible list.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See supra, note 36.
Id.
Id.
See Henkin and Hargrove, Human Rights at 549-51 (cited in note 36).
See Restatement (Third)§ 102(2) (cited in note 28).
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By its count the following acts violate the customary law of human rights: "genocide"; "slavery or the slave trade"; "the murder
or causing the disappearance of individuals"; "torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment"; "prolonged arbitrary detention"; "systematic racial discrimination";
and "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights. "45 Even under this short list, certain
current U.S. practices may or have been called into question.
Prolonged detention of Cuban refugees has led at least one federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus based upon U.S. violation of international custom. 46
Some critics, however, have claimed that the short list is too
short. 47 On this view, customary international human rights
should entail both expansive conceptions of the Restatement
enumeration as well as others not set forth. One example of a
more expansive conception relates to cruel or inhuman treatment. Currently the Restatement declares that this principle does
not prohibit pain and suffering arising from lawful imprisonment
to the extent consistent with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners. While U.S. practice may run
into trouble enough here, a colorable argument can be made
that the customary rule has evolved to prohibit extended imprisonment on death row, especially in light of the European Court
of Human Rights ruling in Soering v. United Kingdom. 48 Meanwhile, examples of additional customary rights plausibly include
a right to equal treatment with regard to religion and gender as
well as the accepted category of race. These additions may not
seem problematic in themselves. Then again, international
equality standards, among other things, tend to reduce state action barriers and increase the scope for affirmative action remedies. In this light, customary equality rights, both old and new,
would at the very least present the U.S. with interesting challenges.49
45. Id. at § 702.
46. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 787 (D. Kan. 1980) affirmed on oth~r
grounds, Rodriquez-Fernandez v. Wikinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (lOth Cir. 1981).
47. See Robert B. Lillich, "Remarks," 1985 Am. Socy. Inti. L. Proc. 84,84-86.
48. In Soering v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that
the United Kingdom would violate the European Convention on Human Rights if it extradited an applicant suspected of murder back to Virginia on the grounds that he could
face "death row" syndrome-i.e., a prolonged, uncertain, and thus inhuman wait for his
execution-if his trial took place in the United States. 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 439, 439
(1989).
49. As any foreign affairs law specialist would recognize, the mini-canon proposed
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CONCLUSION
None of this is to say that a law student, professor, practitioner, or judge cannot, without too much difficulty, get a
grounding in any, all, or more of these topics. To the contrary,
the state of international legal education in America has probably never been better than since Hamilton's day. "Global" programs, courses, journals, conferences, exchanges, and internships
flourish. This form of flourishing, however, has taken place almost entirely within its own nook. With certain exceptions, it
remains the case that the best way not to write for a law review is
to do a piece that appears relevant to an international law review. Put another way, increased interest in international law
has yet to have much effect on the canon or canons that exist in
related areas, and constitutional law is no exception. What
would have to go to make room, and on what basis, is another
matter. Still, it does not seem to be asking for too much for the
constitutional experts of the United States at least to approach
being as cosmopolitan as the constitutional "novices" of Hong
Kong.

here merely scratches the surface. With regard to case law, other leading candidates include: Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that neither domestic nor international law prohibits the U.S. turning back refugees on the high seas);
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty did not prohibit abduction of defendant); and Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968) (invalidating state statute for intruding into foreign affairs matters entrusted
exclusively to the federal government).

